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THE TRANSITIONING OF JEWISH 
BIOMEDICAL LAW: RHETORICAL AND 
PRACTICAL SHIFTS IN HALAKHIC 
DISCOURSE ON SEX-CHANGE SURGERY
Hillel Gray
This article examines discourse dynamics in Jewish law on sex-change 
surgery (SCS) and, in general, transitioning between genders. Orthodox 
medical ethics has moved beyond the abstract condemnation of SCS to 
the design of practical rules for transsexuals living in observant com-
munities. The reasoning against SCS has also shifted, both in complexity 
and with implicit ties to Christian and secular tropes. By medicalizing 
or, conversely, spiritualizing the experiences of transgendered persons, a 
few Orthodox authors are opening up interpretive space for sympathetic 
responses to SCS. Such transitions reach their most elaborate expression 
in Israeli Orthodox rabbi Edan ben Ephraim’s 2004 monograph, Genera-
tion of Perversions, which has taken center stage in Orthodox delibera-
tions on transsexuality. Overall, halakhic discourse seems to be moving 
in innovative, unavoidably interdiscursive directions.
Introduction
Orthodox resistance to changes in Jewish law is, arguably, a strategic self-repre-
sentation. Orthodox communities are responsive at times to the preferences of the 
larger society, even in relation to gender issues that distinguish Orthodoxy from 
non-Orthodox Judaisms. To fully understand the permeability of rabbinic discourse 
on gender, it is helpful to examine attitudes toward transsexuality—that is, toward 
persons who, previously known as males or females, present themselves following 
hormonal treatment and sex-change surgery (SCS) as the other sex, male-to-female 
or female-to-male (MtF, FtM).1
Transsexuality challenges, profoundly, the theological assumption of a created 
human nature: Men are men, women are women. Sexual dimorphism is an inescapable, 
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naturalized presupposition of Western (if not all) societies.2 One might well say that 
this binary is what makes the entire sex-differentiated map of Orthodox Judaism 
workable. To be sure, rabbinic discourse has ancient categories (e.g., androginos) 
that could make space for gender variance. Yet, instantiated throughout Orthodoxy, 
especially in its ultra-Orthodox (ḥaredi) forms, the gender binary is foundational to 
individual duties and aspirations, to the regulation of family and communal life, and 
to the allocation of ritual practices and spaces. It is hard to imagine how Orthodoxy 
could tolerate SCS and integrate transsexuals into such a gender-differentiated forma-
tion. Likewise, rabbinic views of SCS are tied to struggles within Orthodox culture 
to control sexuality. As scholars have shown, attitudes toward transsexuality intersect 
with the history and regulation of homosexuality, even though the linkages are seldom 
articulated in rabbinic texts.3 Accordingly, Orthodox approaches to transsexuality can 
help us understand the resilience of traditionalist rabbinic law on gender and sexuality.
While scholars have delved deeply into SCS in the general society, much less 
attention has been paid to the reception of SCS and transsexuals in Orthodox Juda-
ism. Hence, the purpose of this paper is to examine Orthodox legal discourse on 
SCS, a corpus overlooked in Jewish gender studies, notwithstanding its significant 
repercussions. To identify shifts in the history of Orthodox approaches to SCS, this 
analysis encompasses halakhic texts from the 1970s to the past decade.4 The aim is to 
look carefully and below the surface, to characterize the repertoire of rhetorical and 
practical Jewish legal stances on SCS and transsexuality. The texts I peruse include 
published responsa, articles in rabbinic journals and halakhic pronouncements on 
the internet. Above all, I analyze an extensive 2004 monograph published by an 
Israeli Orthodox rabbi, Edan Ben-Ephraim, entitled Dor tahepukhot (Generation of 
perversions).5
Ben-Ephraim has put a formidable document into play within the Orthodox Jewish 
community. Dor tahepukhot differs from other rabbinic texts on SCS in three sig-
nificant ways. First, Ben-Ephraim is based in the Sefardi religious community, which 
differs in some of its views from the Ashkenazi yeshiva system that has largely domi-
nated halakhic discourse in North America and Israel. He studied at Yeshivat Ḥazon 
Ovadia under Yitzḥak Yosef, son of the late renowned halakhic scholar and Sefardi 
Chief Rabbi of Israel Ovadia Yosef and now himself the Sefardi Chief Rabbi.6 Second, 
perhaps on account of his Sefardi perspective, he makes extensive use of rabbinic lore 
(agadah) and mysticism (kabalah; see below) in discussing what is essentially a legal 
issue. Third, Ben-Ephraim offers the first book-length treatment of SCS, framed as a 
systematic guide to practical halakhah (e.g., pp. 9ff.) To be sure, his mixing of senior 
rabbinic opinions with his own more novice interpretations makes the book come 
across more as a scholarly exercise than as an authoritative text; it received approba-
tions from major rabbinic authorities, but such approbations are common, and Ben-
Ephraim himself has neither the discursive clout nor the reputation of their authors.7 
Nonetheless, in its scope and analytical intensity, his tome outdoes the preceding 
responsa and incidental Orthodox writings on SCS. Ben-Ephraim’s curiosity leaves 
no law sacrosanct, no viewpoint or ruling beyond reproach; even established opinions 
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are tested and retested. This thorough engagement with the topic is a rabbinic practice 
that opens up conversations rather than shutting them down.
In subtle ways, Ben-Ephraim’s work marks a nascent shift in Orthodox thinking 
about SCS. This article explores these shifts in rabbinic legal discourse in three sec-
tions, on, respectively, the legality of SCS, the postoperative assignment of sex for the 
purposes of Jewish law, and the regulation of transsexuality in day-to-day Orthodox 
life. In each case, to highlight the transitions underway in Orthodox discourse, my 
analysis contrasts prior halakhic texts with the approaches taken in Ben-Ephraim’s 
pioneering monograph. As shown in two further sections, potential changes in rab-
binic law are shaped by the psychiatric perspective on transsexuality, which decouples 
biological sex and gender, and by popular conceptions of the gendered soul. These sec-
tions compare Ben-Ephraim’s views with the innovative opinion of modern Orthodox 
Rabbi Dror Brama.
Lest the reader harbor unrealistic expectations, make no mistake: None of the transi-
tions in Orthodox discourse are as revolutionary as those propagated by queer theory 
or the contemporary struggle for legal rights for transsexuals. I ask, rather, whether 
Orthodoxy’s small ripples reveal an instability, a dialogical response to the waves 
of change set in motion by SCS. In its own terms, perhaps traditionalist Judaism is 
also queering gender identities for Jewish law purposes. While not seeking directly 
to overturn halakhic rules against SCS, this emerging Orthodox discourse may have 
opened up interpretive space for sympathetic responses to transsexual persons.
Legality of SCS: Prohibition and Its Rhetorical Expression
Early Rhetorical Responses
Every Orthodox rabbinic text on SCS deems it prohibited under Jewish law.8 Accord-
ing to these texts, Jews who willingly undergo SCS or perform it on others have com-
mitted serious transgressions of biblical rules, as understood in Jewish law and ethics. 
Nevertheless, the reasoning and rhetorical expression of this judgment have varied in 
several important ways.
When SCS first came to the attention of Orthodox halakhic commentators, their 
reactions ran a gamut. During the 1960s–70s, several rabbinic decisors and Jewish 
medical ethicists—J. David Bleich, Lev Grossnass, Avraham Hirsch, Avraham Stein-
berg and others—wrote neutrally or even sympathetically about transsexuals.9 To be 
sure, such sympathy is attained by pathologizing the transsexual. For instance, Bleich 
speaks kindly of Jan Morris’s Conundrum and refers to transsexuality as a “tragic 
condition.”10
By contrast, most authors of a series of responses compiled by the Hebrew ultra-
Orthodox rabbinic journal Hama’or in 1972 were shocked by SCS, denied its rel-
evance to their community and called for an uncompromising stance against any 
future Jewish transsexuals. A hasidic rabbi, Shalom Krausz, opened his response by 
questioning the need for any response at all: “In my opinion, this is beyond the bounds 
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of abomination, and it is not worthwhile wasting time suitable for studying Torah to 
clarify this disgusting matter for them in a responsum.”11 Such rhetoric condemns 
transsexuality by way of a “politics of disgust,” specifically allusion to biblical lan-
guage on homosexuality.12 Another responder with roots in the rabbinic leadership 
of the Satmar hasidic community, R. Hananya Yom Tov Lipa Teitelbaum, used aptly 
surgical imagery: “If this plague [makah] spreads, God forbid, among Jews, we need 
to gather teachers and rabbis together, to unify, all as one, in mind and soul . . . with 
a sharp knife [sakina ḥarifta] against this outbreak.”
Though articulating an opinion on the law, these rabbis exhorted in a theological 
vein by characterizing SCS as an attack on the divinely ordained natural order—a 
more subjective and discretionary principle than, say, the biblical prohibition of 
castration. Teitelbaum wrote: “God created the world and made all forms appropri-
ate and complete. One should not change it at all, and any change is against the will 
of the Creator.”13 Krausz compared SCS to the forbidden mixing of seeds, which he 
saw as grounded in the divine concern for the natural order,14 and to sorcery, which 
also contravenes “the natural way that was established at the beginning of creation.”15
Condemnation of SCS could mean utter rejection of transsexual persons themselves. 
Teitelbaum stated that Jewish transsexuals should be considered no longer Jewish and 
subjected to a rare banning from the Jewish community:
In my humble opinion, anyone who acts thusly to surgically remove the male 
organs, in order to change to female, is in the category of a person who leaves Juda-
ism. [The person] is no longer classified as a Jew and is legally considered . . . an 
apostate to the entire Torah . . . and thereby governed by the laws for non-Jews. . . . 
If the state allows us to issue [a ḥerem, a religious ban] then it is a mitzvah to ban 
and separate from and expel this person completely from the community of Israel.16
However, Hama’or editor Meir Amsel, who had solicited his colleagues’ responsa, 
explained why, in his view, Orthodox rabbis should respond seriously to SCS in 
Jewish legal terms. The ultra-Orthodox (ḥaredi) world should not lock itself up like 
a fortress and pretend that “our Jews” would never be involved with transsexuality. 
Amsel predicted that “the licentious and derelict influence [of society] would also 
enter the [ḥaredi] camp,” so that rabbis would eventually have to rule on the issue. 
To justify his rabbinic analysis of a hypothetical future with Orthodox postsurgery 
transsexuals, he mentioned other situations that merit halakhic deliberations for antici-
pated problems and argued that SCS, from a halakhic point of view, is no worse than 
apostasy or forbidden marriage. Anticipating that some transsexuals would repent of 
their error and seek a halakhic, observant life, Amsel argued that Orthodoxy should 
welcome these “unusual creatures,” provided they repent, and educate them about how 
to conduct themselves according to halakhah. Such sinners could participate in the 
Orthodox community, and MtF transsexuals, even without repentance, could perform 
such male-specific religious duties as the priestly benediction, because otherwise they 
would always be adding sins for dereliction of duty.17
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In the 1970s, Orthodox Judaism was confronting a new reality, a new plateau in the 
capabilities of medical science. Yet, Orthodox rabbis were comfortable with the trope 
of claiming that SCS is actually not new but eerily familiar, and that it had already 
been anticipated and competently addressed by ancient and medieval rabbinic thought. 
With a kind of perverse pride, they cited ancient precursors, pointing, for example, to 
the midrashim according to which Adam and Eve were created as a single, androgy-
nous being, not unlike Siamese twins who are later separated,18 and Dinah, sister of 
Jacob’s twelve sons, was changed in utero from a male to a female on account of her 
mother Leah’s prayer;19 and to the talmudic story of the sage Rava creating a golem, 
a new kind of being—though this comparison implies a critique.20 In a similar, albeit 
harsher vein, Amsel was convinced that “if we knew all the details of the abominations 
of Egypt and Canaan, there is no doubt . . . that this monstrosity [i.e., transsexuality] 
was one of their lewd ways.”21
With this not uncommon hermeneutic, the bodies of transsexuals merge in the rab-
binic imagination with bodies imagined by ancient Jewish lore. For most authors, these 
legendary precursors to transsexuality do not function formally in legal argumentation 
but rather lend an air of competency to the rabbis’ handling of a seeming medical inno-
vation. Avraham Hirsch, an Orthodox rabbi associated for many decades with World 
Agudath Israel, too, reinforces rabbinic competency in citing the Kuzari (4:25) on the 
similar structure of male and female sexual organs22 and, in referring along with other 
commentators, to the early modern responsa of Ḥayim Pelaggi and Ḥayim Miranda 
on persons with intersex conditions.23 While thus demonstrating their virtuosity with 
rabbinic literature, the Orthodox rabbis who discussed SCS in the 1970s listed these 
analogous cases and principles haphazardly. A more nuanced use of these variegated 
cases would have to wait a few more decades.
Dor tahepukhot
To this day, Orthodox rabbinic authorities oppose efforts by transsexual persons to 
change their sex organs or secondary sexual characteristics, whether through surgery 
or through hormonal treatment. No Orthodox authority accepts sexual transition as 
the proper management of gender dysphoria. SCS is said to violate biblical law, the 
strictest category of prohibition—especially the rule against castration, but also the 
prohibitions on cross-dressing and changing the natural order. Over time, rabbinic 
authors have invoked additional Jewish legal principles that they believe would pro-
hibit SCS, but the conclusion has remained constant. In 2002, for instance, Israeli 
Orthodox medical ethicist Yigal Shafran emphasized that the surgery is not only 
forbidden and ugly, but also a “severe abomination.”24
Now let us consider Ben-Ephraim’s Dor tahepukhot, the most creative and com-
prehensive work in the 50-year history of Jewish law on SCS. In its 307 pages, Dor 
tahepukhot covers an unexpectedly wide spectrum of SCS topics, including surgeries, 
the rabbinic approach to scientific “novelties,” the prohibition on SCS, dozens of laws 
that might govern postoperative transsexuals, secular laws, relations with non-Jews, 
homosexuality, the status of androginos (a person with an intersex condition), genetic 
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engineering, the maternity of cloned persons, women in religious rituals, the marriage 
of two transsexuals, and debates about rabbinic sources.25 Ben-Ephraim also describes 
how he came to investigate the topic, when he befriended a newly observant friend (a 
ba‘al teshuvah) who had a transsexual (FtM) sister (p. 9). Through his monograph, 
Ben-Ephraim undertakes to identify and analyze each Jewish law that might prohibit 
SCS. While it is a theoretical work rather than an authoritative rabbinic ruling, it may 
set the intellectual and rhetorical stage for future directions in halakhic discourse.
At first glance, Dor tahepukhot comes across as a no-holds-barred attack on trans-
sexuality, as Ben-Ephraim examines a dozen distinct prohibitions against SCS. None-
theless, it might strike an observer that the more his list of violations expands, the less 
definitive it appears. After all, if SCS were irrefutably outlawed by any single biblical 
rule, why would halakhic texts need to creatively propose more laws that might pro-
hibit it? Perhaps the cumulative recitation of violations is expected to resonate with 
some readers, but those attentive to legal argumentation may be left unpersuaded.
In reviewing the intricacies of each apparent prohibition, moreover, Ben-Ephraim 
manages to dig up or hint at leniencies—at reasons why the prohibition might not 
apply to some or all types of SCS. For instance, the biblical castration rule applies 
most clearly to the surgeon—not to the patient, though the latter might be liable for 
the prior arrangements that put the surgery in place. Transsexual patients could still 
be forbidden to abet the surgeon’s sin, but their own sin might be limited, insofar 
as they are anesthetized at the time of the prohibited action (p. 57).26 Ben-Ephraim 
further asks if the injunction against the surgeon might be malleable if a non-Jewish 
surgeon is involved.
Furthermore, Ben-Ephraim shows that the strongest legal rationale for a clear-cut 
ban on SCS, the biblical prohibition of castration, applies differently to women, who 
are not punished for what the rabbis consider the female equivalent of castration—a 
nuance that had already drawn attention.27 While it might seem to derive solely from 
longstanding Jewish law, this asymmetry in the rabbinic treatment of FtM trans-
sexuality echoes the asymmetry, in the general population, between the transition 
experiences of natal males as opposed to females. Natal females (FtMs) are more 
inclined toward nonsurgical options, adjust more smoothly to transition regardless of 
surgery, and are less likely, medically, socially and psychologically, to be perceived 
as needing surgery.28 Jewish law applies a severe injunction against MtF surgery, in 
effect matching the greater demand by MtF transsexuals, while adopting a far more 
lenient approach to FtM persons, seemingly in line with their lesser need or demand 
for genital surgery.
Ben-Ephraim uncovers additional leniencies. For instance, SCS is often said to be 
prohibited on account of the biblical ban on wearing garments of the opposite sex. 
Ben-Ephraim shows how this ban’s application to SCS could be disputed. After all, 
the surgery itself does not involve any items to be worn,29 and if SCS reassigns a per-
son’s sex, then the rule would be moot.30 Likewise, he questions whether SCS would 
contravene the halakhic prohibition against changing the created order. He points 
out that the rule might only apply to changes brought about by sorcery (kishuf), and 
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he doubts that the divine fiat (ḥok) against mixed species can be adapted to cover 
SCS merely by speculative reasoning. By the same token, Dor tahepukhot seems to 
undermine efforts to prohibit SCS as profaning God’s name (so does soccer, notes 
Ben-Ephraim—p. 58) and as transgressing the biblical laws regarding damaged male 
genitalia (patzua‘ daka’ and kerut shofkhah), which would regulate only postoperative 
relations and would not apply to FtM transsexuals (p. 671).
The book also touches on the prohibition against causing grief to one’s parents and 
family, derived by rabbinic authorities from the obligation to honor one’s parents and 
from other biblical laws (e.g., Deut. 27.16). Ben-Ephraim asserts that SCS causes grief 
and shame, even if the parents are not observant Jews. But he offers no evidence for 
this assertion, an omission that may implicitly index a leniency. Indeed, anticipating 
that some parents would accept their transsexual child, Ben-Ephraim asserts that 
such acceptance is irrelevant because the parents’ shame is built into the situation. By 
making such flat and unsupported assertions, his relatively weak argument here opens 
the door to opposing arguments for leniency (e.g., that the Jewish law against causing 
parental grief might not apply under various contingencies).
To be sure, Ben-Ephraim presents several undiluted or unqualified prohibitions 
against SCS. In one short section, for instance, he argues that the surgery would violate 
the Jewish law against self-wounding. He states: “Though there is no concern about 
the prohibition against self-wounding whenever there is medical need . . . however, in 
our case [of SCS], since there is no medical need whatsoever,” the prohibition applies 
(p. 55).31 Still, one wonders whether his brief treatment of self-wounding might be 
read as implicitly pointing to the opportunity for an exemption based on “medical 
need”—as has been claimed.32 A second clear violation, according to Dor tahepukhot, 
is that of nullifying the ability to procreate. Ben-Ephraim’s analysis does not seem 
to leave much room to maneuver in this regard, save an exception for a person who 
has already fulfilled the commandment of procreation before undergoing SCS (p. 63). 
A third, related violation noted by Ben-Ephraim is that SCS might be considered to 
void the fulfillment of the procreation commandment by the transsexual’s father. In 
explaining the problem, though, Ben-Ephraim of course points out that the father 
could fulfill this commandment through his other children.
Thus, if the basic thrust of Ben-Ephraim’s book, and its upfront summary, affirm 
the prohibition of SCS, upon close examination the book in subtle ways under-
mines its own apparent condemnation. Perhaps this is an unavoidable outcome, to 
be expected of any in-depth monograph on a matter of rabbinic law, since the deep 
structure of talmudic reasoning is multivocal and pluralistic. Still, it means that in-
depth “insider” knowledge shaves away at the unwavering public face of prohibition. 
If Ben-Ephraim is partly subverting the law against SCS, he does so by chipping away 
at the multiplicity of reasons posed in its support—a death by a thousand paper cuts.
These leniencies are not the kind of sweeping exemption invoked by rabbinic 
authorities to permit outright other, even related, surgeries. Notably, rabbis have 
authorized cosmetic surgery for a patient’s greater good, or the removal of reproduc-
tive organs (hysterectomy or orchiectomy) in cases of uterine or testicular cancer.33 
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This is not to say that Ben-Ephraim is unaware of the potential relevance of a pikuaḥ 
nefesh (“saving a life”) exemption for SCS. Without any trace of irony, he applies that 
very principle in one instance: Penitent transsexual persons are allowed to surgically 
reverse their previous sex change (p. 126). Such surgery on the genitalia might be 
considered forbidden as an unnecessary medical risk, yet it could be justified, Ben-
Ephraim argues, if a psychiatrist verified that its denial would cause so much mental 
anguish as to constitute a danger. He goes on to adduce a series of halakhic rulings to 
justify reversal in cases of mental anguish.34
For the reader who favors SCS, this section of Dor tahepukhot seems counterintui-
tive, because, for the sake of lending rabbinic support to the possibility of reversal, a 
relatively rare event, Ben-Ephraim offers precisely those rulings that could be cited to 
justify SCS in the first place, as medically necessary to alleviate the mental anguish 
produced by gender dysphoria. Such reasoning also could conceivably be applied, ex 
post facto, to mitigate the illegality of SCS. One Orthodox transsexual told me that 
a prominent Orthodox rabbi had indicated privately that SCS can be understood as 
a kind of desperate act, committed under the duress (’ones) of emotional suffering.35 
This understanding of duress could be invoked to absolve the postoperative Jew of 
guilt for transgressing the rules against surgery. However, mental anguish would not 
suffice to condone or permit SCS ab initio. Nor would such an interpretation of duress 
go uncontested, if it were to be published.36
Rabbinic Debate on Postoperative Sex Assignments
Does SCS Effectively Reassign Sex under Jewish Law?
Once rabbinic thinkers faced the issue of SCS, an early and central question was 
whether the surgery would actually reassign patients’ halakhic sex, that is, their sex 
identity for the purpose of Jewish law. Two contrary legal views soon emerged in 
this regard. One view accepts that the surgery does reassign halakhic sex, because 
the latter depends on outward appearances, especially external genitalia—that is, on 
phenotype.37 The second view does not concede, ex post facto, that a man can become 
a woman, or vice versa, because it sees halakhic sex as depending, in effect, on one’s 
underlying genetic situation—that is, on genotype. As we shall see, Ben-Ephraim 
supports a hybrid of these dichotomous approaches to halakhic sex assignment.
A key figure in the halakhic dispute over sex reassignment was R. Eliezer Walden-
berg, a prominent Jewish medical ethicist in Israel. Over the course of a few years, 
Waldenberg wrote responsa on both SCS and pediatric intersex surgery, in both cases 
relying on the phenotypic argument. In a 1967 responsum, Waldenberg opined that 
SCS would alter a person’s halakhic sex and marital situation. As precedents, he 
invoked two pre-modern responsa annulling the marriages of women who reportedly 
had been changed into men by natural causes.38 Similarly, reasoned Waldenberg, since 
two persons of the same sex cannot be married to each other under Jewish law, SCS 
would automatically dissolve a transsexual’s marriage, without the need for a get, a 
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traditional Jewish divorce document.39 In 1970, Waldenberg stated the phenotype rule 
explicitly in a responsum on a neonatal intersex case: “it is clear that only the external 
organs, which are different in males and females, determine [a person’s assigned] 
sex in practice.”40 Several other rabbis have favored Waldenberg’s 1970 position of 
assigning halakhic sex according to phenotype.41
By contrast, a number of prominent Orthodox rabbis have ruled that when physical 
sex is ambiguous or disputed, halakhic sex should be based on genotype. In other 
words, bodies with XY chromosomes are male, and those with XX are female. The 
genotype view (or its equivalent) has been dominant in Orthodox Jewish legal dis-
course; prominent supporters include leading Israeli medical ethicist Avraham Sofer 
Abraham and the late preeminent American halakhic authority Moshe Feinstein.42 
From the genotype standpoint, surgery cannot change a person’s sex for the purposes 
of Jewish law. Orthodox rabbis who favor genotype avoid the appearance of encourag-
ing or validating SCS ex post facto. The Catholic Church has similarly rejected the 
surgical reassignment of sex, as have several U.S. states.43
As could be expected, the two competing approaches to halakhic sex assignment 
(phenotype vs. genotype) are not based on the voluntary choice or self-identification 
of transsexual patients and their physicians. In contemporary secular biomedical 
law and ethics, patient choice is often the decisive factor. However, rabbinic medical 
ethics typically subordinates patient choice to such principles as the preservation of 
human life, the minimizing of pain and suffering, beneficence and nonmaleficence, 
human dignity, the fulfillment of biblical commandments, respect for rabbinic teach-
ings and so on. As a result, as pivotal a Jewish law question as sex assignment is 
unlikely to hinge on patient choice. Understandably, Orthodox Jewish transsexuals 
oppose the assignment of a person’s sex by genotype. Many postoperative transsexu-
als favor deciding sex by external appearance, since this approach recognizes the sex 
reassignment sought by surgery.44
Two more recent developments favor the genotype view among Orthodox hal-
akhic experts. First, Waldenberg’s support for phenotypic sex assignment has been 
called into question, especially following a 1997 opinion in which he apparently 
treated a specific transsexual as an androginos.45 Several rabbis have argued that the 
external appearances rule formulated by Waldenberg, who died in 2006, has been 
misconstrued, and that it should not apply to SCS, because the bodies of transsexuals 
have reconstructed genitalia, not their original, functioning genitalia.46 Second, in a 
responsum relying largely on Waldenberg’s approach based on external appearance, 
the Committee on Law and Standards of the Conservative Movement’s Rabbinical 
Assembly has approved phenotypic reassignment of sex after sex change surgery.47 
Since Orthodox authorities tend to distance themselves from the views of the more 
modernist Conservative Movement, the latter’s endorsement of Waldenberg could 
further undermine support for phenotypic sex assignment within Orthodox halakhic 
views.
If followed rigorously, the immutability of genotypic sex would certainly deter 
SCS and transsexuality. However, genotypic assignment of halakhic sex also has 
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drawbacks. It can hardly describe historical understandings of halakhic sex in the 
era before chromosomal testing. It also does not suitably assign (halakhic) sex for 
certain intersex conditions.48 Moreover, some Orthodox rabbis have started to rethink 
a flat genotypic formula for sex assignment regarding persons with intersex condi-
tions. For example, Asher Weiss states that phenotype is primary, though he partly 
accommodates the use of genetic testing.49
Citing legal precedents, Ben-Ephraim rejects the majority view that halakhic sex 
should be determined by genotype; like Waldenberg, he accepts that sex should be 
determined by a person’s outward appearance, that is, their genitalia. But, unlike 
Waldenberg in his 1967 statement, Ben-Ephraim rejects the notion that surgical 
reshaping of genitalia would matter. In contrast to the two leading views, Ben-Ephraim 
argues that only a person’s natal phenotype matters. He thereby differentiates a per-
son’s original genitalia from their surgical reconstruction. (He also claims that each 
person’s halakhic sex is an attribute of the soul at birth; see below.) Hence, though 
Ben-Ephraim does not say this outright, his natal-phenotype view is functionally 
equivalent to a genotypic assignment for transsexuals.50 Before explaining why Ben-
Ephraim advocates this hybrid natal-phenotype approach, it is instructive to see how 
he would adjust the rabbinic regulatory regime for people whose halakhic sex does 
not match their postoperative presentation.
Regulation: How Should Jewish Law Treat Postoperative Transsexuals in Practice?
Whichever way transsexuals are assigned a sex for halakhic purposes, they can bring 
complex challenges into any Orthodox Jewish community in which they hope to par-
ticipate. Women and men are distinguished throughout Jewish marriage and family 
law, of course, but also in numerous other areas of Orthodox Jewish life. Orthodox 
social space is choreographed by informal rules and by Jewish law governing physi-
cal contact, ritual segregation, the seclusion of individuals of opposite sexes together 
in closed spaces, text study and interaction between the sexes. In religious practices, 
men’s obligations and ritual roles differ markedly from women’s. Adherents of Jewish 
praxis are expected to act in line with their assigned sex and, accordingly, face strong 
incentives to resolve any uncertainties. In short, any Jew who does not conform to 
conventional sexual dimorphism will have a hard time fitting into Orthodox social 
spaces and religious practices.
Gradually, however, some Orthodox clergy and communities are encountering 
postoperative transsexuals who seek tolerance and inclusion. Accordingly, rabbinic 
scholars are endeavoring to figure out the repercussions of SCS for the religious 
observances of the individuals involved, as well as their families and communities. In 
view of the fundamental dispute over the sex assignment of transsexuals, postoperative 
transsexuals could face at least three regulatory schemes, depending upon whether 
their community’s approach favors the assignment of sex by genotype, by phenotype, 
or perhaps by a hybrid view of the type suggested by Ben-Ephraim.
In communities where the view that assignment of halakhic sex is determined by 
genotype prevails, it is fair to assume that an MtF transsexual who appeared as female 
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would not be allowed to function as a woman; and if they dressed in clothes typically 
worn by women, which would be understood as cross-dressing in violation of Jewish 
law, they would likely be excluded from men’s roles as well. A community could still 
welcome violators of the cross-dressing law, but they might be excluded from most 
ritual and other religious activities. This is the majority view.
Alternatively, if the community accepts the assignation of sexual identity by pheno-
type (genitalia), transsexuals might be permitted to participate in line with their reas-
signed sexual identity. With phenotypic sex assignment, the postoperative transsexual 
has both a new halakhic sex and, in effect, the status of a new legal person—a status 
that may be unsettling, or worse.51 Not only would a marriage be annulled, according 
to Waldenberg, after one partner undergoes sex change surgery, but, as Michael Broyde 
pointed out, this could imply that the transsexual loses their parental rights and duties, 
too.52 Still, since the assigned sex would match the person’s desired appearance, the 
phenotype approach offers transsexuals the least complicated entrée into communal 
Orthodox life. By recognizing the reassigned sex, an Orthodox community could 
allow the transsexual to participate in nearly all ritual practices and social interactions.
For better or worse, Jewish transsexuals confirm that the genotype vs. phenotype 
divide has resulted in polarized communal reactions to their presence. Several MtF 
transwomen told me about rabbis who would only accept them in their synagogues 
if they appeared as men.53 Michelle spoke of feeling extremely humiliated by one 
Orthodox rabbi who addressed her in the synagogue, publicly, as a male. By contrast, 
another rabbi invited her home for Sabbath dinner and sat her among his daughters and 
other women in segregated seating. Similarly, Naomi told me that one rabbi called her 
crazy and insisted that she dress as a man if she wished to go to his synagogue. But 
another Orthodox rabbi told her that he is “LGBT positive.” (I am not aware of any 
transsexual persons who participate in Jewish life by appearing as their genotypic or 
birth sex rather than their transitioned identity.)
Even in Jewish communities where rabbis technically recognize a reassigned sex, 
transsexuals may not feel welcome, as they are subjected to ostracism or prejudice 
outside the purview of Jewish law. Two transsexuals told me about receiving rabbinic 
advice to live their lives as new persons, presumably in line with their phenotypic sex, 
and one was advised to relocate to a new Orthodox community and keep their past as 
the other sex secret.54 Nevertheless, in the sex-divided world of Jewish Orthodoxy, if 
genotype implies rejection, phenotype implies acceptance.
Ben-Ephraim, however, shows that Jewish law need not be collapsed into a binary 
choice between rejection and acceptance. Since he would assign halakhic sex by natal 
phenotype, we might expect that he would have communities exclude transsexuals who 
present as their surgically reconstructed sex. Instead, Ben-Ephraim advances a key 
regulatory principle for absorbing transsexuals into Jewish life: While they retain their 
preoperative halakhic sexual identity, they may, in effect, be treated consistently with 
their postoperative, transitioned appearance for the purpose of Jewish laws govern-
ing the public sphere and social relations.55 This socializing principle modulates the 
rejectionist impulse of genotypic and natal-phenotypic sex assignment.56
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With this discretionary principle in hand, Ben-Ephraim makes a herculean effort to 
figure out when and how the conventional sex roles can be waived for the transsexual. 
He reevaluates about two dozen areas of Jewish law where a transsexual’s sex assign-
ment would matter. The list of Jewish legal topics is itself revealing (see the Appendix). 
While questions about marriage, divorce and sexual relations have received the most 
sustained attention, Ben-Ephraim’s list shows the extent to which religious law might 
claim to regulate the bodies of transsexuals, with respect to their physical contact 
with other bodies, the company they keep, their voices and clothing, private ritual 
non-performance (blessings, circumcision and numerous other mitzvot), participation 
in public ritual (prayer leading, Torah reading, synagogue seating, mourner’s kaddish), 
their legal and economic rights and roles (inheritance, witnessing) and even disposal 
of their earthly remains.
Rabbinic discourse is gradually making special accommodations for transsexuals, 
as either imagined or genuine participants in Orthodox life. Ben-Ephraim explores 
creatively—and unflinchingly— how halakhic regulations for transsexuality may be 
refined and justified.57 For example, to avoid impropriety, the seclusion of unmarried 
individuals of opposite sexes is forbidden. However, Ben-Ephraim states that an MtF 
transwoman may be secluded with a woman but not with a man, even though the MtF 
is a genotypic and hence a halakhic male. Ben-Ephraim’s social interactions principle 
can have curious results. For instance, although women in Orthodoxy generally are not 
given the honor of an ‘aliyah during public reading of the Torah, Ben-Ephraim states 
that FtM persons may be given this honor, despite their halakhic status as females, 
because they pass as men publicly.58
This innovative regulatory scheme is rooted, I believe, in Ben-Ephraim’s commit-
ment to natal phenotype as a new halakhic sexual identity marker. How does he justify 
this approach to sexual identity in halakhic and Jewish terms?
The Souls of Transsexuals
To better understand Ben-Ephraim’s hybrid approach to transsexual identity, let us 
delve into the heart of Dor tahepukhot. As I hinted above, even as Ben-Ephraim 
details the halakhic prohibitions against SCS, in subtle and perhaps unintended ways 
he shows that most prohibitions might be unraveled. In other words, the book states 
that SCS is completely sinful ab initio, and yet, in the fine print, Ben-Ephraim finds 
ways to qualify, limit or undermine the rabbinic law on transsexuals.
In one remarkable section (pp. 69–82), Ben-Ephraim seeks to settle the question of 
halakhic sex by examining the human soul from a kabbalistic perspective.59 Questions 
about the soul have been raised by Catholic ethicist Bernard Guevin, too, on the basis 
of the belief of many transsexuals that they have the soul of a female in a male body, or 
vice versa. Guevin argues against the notion of a sexed soul.60 However, Ben-Ephraim 
treats the soul as sexually identified from the time of its creation and as the basis for 
determining halakhic sex.61
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Ben-Ephraim begins with the kabbalistic view that the body is merely the garment 
of the soul. Moreover, it is the Jewish soul that is instructed to observe the command-
ments (p. 72). Non-Jews, he asserts, do not have a neshamah—the highest level of 
soul—but rather a nefesh ḥayah (roughly: a life force); hence God sends each convert 
a neshamah upon conversion (p. 73). There is a strong kabbalistic tie between the char-
acter of the soul and the degree of one’s obligation for commandments (mitzvot). Since 
women are not obligated to fulfill as many commandments as men, it can be inferred 
that women have different souls (p. 74). Moreover, Ben-Ephraim adduces kabbalistic 
sources to show that no bodily changes can disrupt the commandments laid upon a 
soul (p. 75). He states an interim conclusion: “It is clear that humans do not change sex 
through surgical means, and surgery does not raise or lower one’s obligation to Torah 
commandments, because the essence of the obligation of commandments is derived 
from the unchanging human soul” (p. 76). In other words, he posits that Jewish law 
governs only the soul, which is untouched by surgery.
Delving further into the Jewish mysteries of the soul, however, Ben-Ephraim finds 
an apparently conflicting kabbalistic view. What if a soul does not match its body’s 
sex? Ben-Ephraim points to a series of rabbinic texts indicating that a man might 
occasionally be given a feminine soul and consequently would act like a woman. 
Nevertheless, he would still be fully obligated as a man, due to his unaltered male 
body. Dor tahepukhot (pp. 76f) analyzes a series of rabbinic references to a soul’s 
sex changes or sex reversal, based mainly on kabbalistic interpretations of biblical 
and talmudic texts.62 He also brings the case of the masculine soul of the wife of 
Ḥayim Vital, a founder of Lurianic kabbalah. These cases would seem to disprove his 
previous hypothesis that Jewish law governs only the soul:
Certainly, in such a case, we do not say that this man is obligated for command-
ments like women, since his soul is the soul of a woman, but rather he is [still] 
obligated for commandments like a man, in every matter. (p. 77)
Regardless of the femininity of his soul, a man’s obligations are those of a man. 
Consequently, Ben-Ephraim shifts directions:
It is clear from this discussion that the obligatoriness of commandments depends 
not on the soul but on the body. We should not gauge the behavior and activities of 
a person in order to declare that he has a feminine soul (as is done [in non-Jewish 
discourse] with men who have sex-change surgeries). . . . Apparently, the [situa-
tion] is not like what I wrote at the beginning [of this section], that the principle 
[of obligation] follows the person’s soul. (p. 81)
With this rhetorical about-face, which the text does not foreshadow in its preceding 
emphasis on the soul, Ben-Ephraim shifts to the body as the locus of Jewish norms.
At this juncture, Dor tahepukhot brings rabbinic texts to show how the command-
ments may be grounded in the body, not the soul. Ben-Ephraim tries to reconcile 
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the competing kabbalistic views. He is persuaded that, although it was the soul that 
received the fundamental order to obey the commandments, it is the ensouled body 
(male or female) that serves to determine the concrete, sex-differentiated law for each 
person.63 Thus, he concludes, because the body’s original sex is unchanged, SCS 
cannot alter halakhic obligations and sexual identity (p. 81). Yet Dor tahepukhot seems 
tentative about this chain of inferences, since the author declares that truth is elusive: 
more needs to be revealed; man is unable to discern God’s secrets; even the masters 
of kabbalah felt they had not totally grasped the truth; and so on.64
Ben-Ephraim then tackles evidence about bodily changes that could trip up the last 
step in his argument. Assuming now that halakhic duties are bound up with the body, 
Ben-Ephraim turns to analyzing a hodgepodge of body transformations in rabbinic 
literature, including:
– Pelaggi’s responsum about a married woman who changed into a man;
– the “natural transformations” of one species into another, such as hyenas turning 
into bats after seven years, per BT Bava kama 16a;
– the monthly change in sex of an androginos;
– lycanthropy and other transformations of humans into animals, including cat, 
donkey and monkey, caused by divine intervention or sorcery;
– the aforementioned sex reassignment in utero of the biblical character of Dinah;
– the transformation of Nebuchadnezzar into a beast and back again, based on Dan. 
4:29f, and instances of people who were changed by living among or being raised 
by monkeys or wolves. (pp. 82–85)
While these cases may appear legendary, they serve Ben-Ephraim as precedents, 
since in some of them the applicable Jewish law could be said to have shifted with 
the bodily transformations.
Since rabbinic texts thus could be shown to recognize that halakhic sex can vary 
with transformations in the body, one might suppose that Jewish law could likewise 
shift with the body as transformed by sex change surgery. However, Ben-Ephraim 
argues that there is a difference between “natural” or “divine” transformations and 
those wrought surgically. He asserts that, since the above sex or species transitions 
were natural and divinely ordained, they do not disprove his claim that artificial, 
unnatural surgery cannot truly alter a person’s halakhic sex. In the end, he concludes 
that “the human soul and the original form of its creation” determine Jewish law’s 
obligations and its concomitant assignment of sex (pp. 34, 69, 115).
While such kabbalistic beliefs rarely enter into a halakhic analysis of SCS, Ben-
Ephraim’s ideas can be taken further. In an unpublished manuscript, another Israeli 
Orthodox rabbi, Dror Brama, has raised the possibility that a transsexual might be 
correct in claiming to be placed in the wrong body. Brama, who has worked in London 
for Torah MiTzion, a religious Zionist institution, and is affiliated with the religious 
Zionist rabbinic organization Tzohar, compares transsexuality to a form of prophecy, 
in that a prophetic role may be attributed to people who correctly figure out that their 
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bodies do not match their souls. He does not point to any concrete implications for 
rabbinic law.65
In emphasizing the disjuncture between the transsexual person’s soul and body, 
Ben-Ephraim’s and Brama’s texts resonate with the “wrong body” motif so common in 
secular discourse by and about transsexuals. In secular settings, it has been typical for 
a preoperative transsexual to aver that he or she is a woman or man, or a woman’s or 
man’s soul, trapped in a body of the opposite sex.66 This motif became widely known 
through the story of Christine Jorgensen, the first famous transsexual in the United 
States. In medical discourse, the “wrong body” construct was highlighted in 1966 by 
Harry Benjamin, a pioneer in the diagnosis of transsexuality:
[The fully developed transsexual] lives only for the day when his “female soul” is 
no longer being outraged by his male body, when he can function as a female—
socially, legally, and sexually.67
In self-disclosures that helped justify their diagnosis and subsequent surgery, trans-
sexuals have frequently voiced this notion of a gendered soul in the wrong body, and 
Ben-Ephraim adduces it, too (p. 23).68 Though he does not say so overtly, readers 
may infer that his in-depth analysis of the kabbalah’s concept of a gendered soul is 
unexpectedly responsive to popular and diagnostic conceptions of transsexuality as a 
condition of a gendered soul in the wrong body.
Sympathy for the Different? Halakhic Innovations in Transition
Not surprisingly, both the phenotype and the genotype approaches to halakhic sex are 
developing some mechanisms, albeit limited, to absorb transsexuals into Orthodox 
Jewish life. Taking either approach, it is feasible under Jewish law to allow transsexual 
persons to participate in Jewish prayer and ritual activities in their chosen sexual iden-
tity. Yet even when their participation is considered technically allowed by Jewish law, 
social ostracism can make it unworkable. In practice, Jewish transsexuals report that 
they are welcomed with their reassigned sex in some Orthodox synagogues but not 
in others. It is unclear whether the practical rule-making for transsexuals, and their 
occasional integration into Orthodox life, may help alter anti-transsexual rhetoric. In 
any case, the public now has access to a slow trickle of Orthodox rabbinic viewpoints 
about transsexuals and their real-life situations.69
In a concrete route toward leniency, Orthodox Jewish legal discourse has increas-
ingly spoken of transsexuality as a pathology, a form of rabbinically defined mental 
illness.70 The medicalization of transsexuality puts seemingly insular Orthodox writ-
ings in conversation with non-Jewish discourses, such as those of secular psychology 
and Catholic bioethics.71 In a 2008 statement, Brama, who strikes me as one of the 
more sympathetic Orthodox commentators on SCS, discussed the psychological chal-
lenges for preoperative transsexuals. He has written the only Orthodox responsum in 
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my dataset to refer specifically to a psychiatric diagnosis such as gender dysphoria.72 
Brama frames this diagnosis in the premodern rabbinic vocabulary for psychologi-
cal conditions, arguing that the desire to change one’s sex fits the rabbinic category 
of a person who, though otherwise functional and healthy, is obsessively disturbed 
about a single matter (shoteh ledavar eḥad). He appreciates (“I write in sorrow”) that 
transsexuals may feel hurt by this rabbinic mental health designation, regardless of 
the diagnosis they may have received from their doctors. In addition, Brama takes a 
fascinating stance toward the biological underpinnings of transsexuality. He antici-
pates that it may well be found to be a biophysical problem rather than a (merely) 
psychological one, and that it may be treatable by way of medication. In debates over 
homosexuality, such biological determinism has muted moral criticisms predicated 
on viewing homosexuality as a preference rather than as a neurophysical condition.
Brama’s categorization of transsexuality within Jewish law as a psychological disor-
der has implications that may be meaningful and beneficial to Orthodox transsexuals. 
He emphasizes that the obsessive status might exempt transsexuals from sex-differenti-
ated commandments relating to their psychological condition,73 such as donning tefilin 
(phylacteries) for a halakhic male, and might open up options for them to participate 
freely in various sex-segregated practices.74 He insists, moreover, that transsexuals 
should be treated like anyone with an illness—that is, with kindness.75 It seems that 
a route to compassion, if not to acceptance, is through pathologizing transsexuality.
It is instructive in this regard to compare Brama’s views with those taken by hal-
akhic experts within the Conservative movement. Not surprisingly, Conservative 
Judaism has also moved toward a less restrictive stance toward transsexuals, and its 
scholars, too, have done so by defining their status as pathological. In the 2003 respon-
sum endorsed by the Committee on Law and Standards of the Rabbinical Assembly, 
Mayer Rabinowitz defined transsexuality as gender dysphoria, a psychiatric diagnosis 
described in the DSM. In an appendix, Rabinowitz argued that there may be grounds 
under Jewish law to allow SCS ab initio, on the basis of the principle of beneficence—
of permitting an intervention “for the good of the ill person” (letovat haḥoleh). This 
dispensation would apply on the basis of the assumption, or even stipulation, that 
the transsexual suffers from a dysphoria that SCS would treat. In a cautionary tone, 
Rabinowitz’s responsum concludes that the “long-term effectiveness” of SCS has not 
yet adequately been studied, and pre-operative transsexuals should be counseled to 
take this lack of sufficient evidence into account.76
Another Conservative scholar advocates a further step in accepting transsexuals by 
virtue of their medical condition. Leonard A. Sharzer has proposed that transsexuals 
be assigned halakhic sex based not merely on postoperative genitalia, as the Rabi-
nowitz responsum had stipulated. Instead, Sharzer would assign halakhic sex purely 
on the basis of the diagnosis of a psychological condition, gender dysphoria, without 
requiring SCS.77 Sharzer’s as-yet-unpublished proposal has had little effect on rab-
binic discourse on SCS, but it merges conceptually with Ben-Ephraim’s approach to 
transsexuality in halakhah. In both views, sex assignment and transitioning should be 
evaluated by attention to the psyche or soul.
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Conclusion
Over the past forty years, Orthodox Jewish legal discourse has not been static in 
responding to sex-change surgery. Early commentators expressed the most shock at 
SCS, disparaged transsexuality harshly and denied its relevance to observant Jews. 
However, while deprecating sentiments continue to be expressed, rabbinic writings 
have emerged that approach SCS with more equanimity and take for granted the need 
to offer guidance.
SCS is increasingly analyzed in practical terms. There has been detailed halakhic 
analysis of how to regulate the religious observance and social conduct of transsexu-
als. Over the years, some Orthodox authors have found ways to express sympathy for 
them. Exposure to other religious and secular medical discourses has led some rabbis 
and halakhic experts to begin treating transsexuality less as a “deviant” lifestyle choice 
than as a severe psychological disorder. This shift is opening up interpretive space 
for further sympathetic responses. In effect, the rabbinic elite within traditionalist 
Judaism has begun showing its dexterity at conceptualizing the regulatory regime for 
postoperative transsexual bodies.
To date, the prohibition against SCS remains intact within Orthodox Jewish circles. 
This bright-line prohibition of SCS is backed up by authoritative precedents, justified 
by multiple halakhic rules and reinforced by a cross-cultural discourse linking trans-
sexuality to the thorny issue of homosexuality. Most Orthodox rabbis are unlikely to 
jeopardize their reputation for strict opposition to the latter by showing any leniency 
toward the former. Nevertheless, a groundwork for change is being laid by recent 
rabbinic writings, such as Ben-Ephraim’s exploration of potential leniencies, Brama’s 
attention to transsexuality as a psychological dysphoria and a few non-Orthodox argu-
ments for permitting SCS ab initio. Orthodox transsexuals are aware that SCS might 
be condoned ex post facto as an inexorable compulsion, even if it is never officially 
condoned ab initio.78 To be sure, these incremental moves at the margins of Orthodox 
halakhic discourse have so far had minimal impact on the prevailing authorities in 
North America and Israel.
Although Orthodox Jewish discourse rarely acknowledges any explicit influence 
from non-Jewish moral discourses, the deliberations over SCS can readily be seen as 
alluding to outside concerns and responding to non-Jewish norms. Notably, as described 
above, Jewish law has begun to engage with the pathologizing of transsexuality as a 
psychological condition. To be sure, from the perspective of transgender persons and 
their allies, a medicalizing Orthodox rabbinic discourse is trailing recent efforts to 
depathologize SCS and transsexuality in mainstream society. Yet, within the current 
context of Orthodox Jewish law, pathologizing is innovative, especially as it appears 
to echo non-Jewish moral concerns. Other dialogical Jewish interactions with outside 
views may be inferred from rabbinic conversations about “passing” by transsexuals, 
from the “the wrong body” discourse that has permeated Orthodox texts, and, argu-
ably, from the asymmetry in Jewish handling of MtF versus FtM transitions. While it 
is premature to predict the impact of opinions like those of Ben-Ephraim and Brama, 
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these developments suggest that Orthodox halakhic thinking on SCS is gradually 
transitioning in its responsiveness to the broader social dynamics around transsexuality.
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Appendix
Selected Jewish Law Topics for Postoperative Transsexuals79
Aliyah (Torah 
reading honor)
May an FtM transsexual receive an honor during the public 
reading of the Torah?80
Blessings81 Should an FtM transsexual say the blessing recited daily 
by males, praising God for “not making me a woman”—or 
what alternative blessing? Should an MtF transsexual say the 








Should or may an FtM transsexual receive a ritual 
circumcision (brit milah)?
Can an MtF convert to Judaism without circumcision?83
Divorce Does sex change surgery void a marriage?
Does the wife of a transsexual require a divorce document 
(get) in order to remarry? 
Dress and 
head-covering
Should transsexuals wear sex-differentiated clothing and 
head-coverings for their birth or their reassigned sex? Should 
a married, divorced or widowed transsexual observe the 
head-covering rules for women? 
Performance of 
ritual command-
ments for FtM 
transsexuals
Must a FtM transsexual fulfill ritual commandments incum-
bent upon men, such as tefilin (phylacteries), tzitzit (fringes), 
shofar (blowing of the ram’s horn), sitting in a sukah (on the 
Festival of Booths), counting the ‘omer between the holidays 
of Pesach and Shavu‘ot, etc.? If these are not required, are 
they permitted? If permitted, should they recite the usual 
blessing?
Could an FtM trans-man fulfill duties on behalf of (other) 
men?84
Female voice Which transsexuals are subject to restrictions upon hearing 
or performing of female voices singing in public?
Inheritance. Do male inheritance rules apply to MtF or FtM transsexuals?
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Exemption from 
male duties for MtF 
transsexuals
Must a MtF transsexual (still) fulfill duties from which 
women are exempt, such as Torah study, procreation, tefilin, 
hair and shaving rules and, if of priestly lineage, avoiding 
corpse impurity? Must an FtM fulfill these duties? 
Marriage May a transsexual marry according to Jewish law? If so, to 
whom?85
If a transsexual attempts a marriage, is it considered valid?
Meḥitzah (sepa-
rates sexes during 
prayer)
Should transsexuals sit with their birth or reassigned 
sex in the synagogue and at religious functions that are 
sex-separated?
Mourner’s kaddish Which transsexuals may say the mourner’s kaddish (a 
memorial prayer) in the synagogue?
Prayer leader May FtM transsexuals lead a worship service? (See note 84)
Quorum Which, if any, transsexuals (FtM or MtF) can be counted 
among the quorum of ten for prayer, or the quorum of three 
for the Grace after Meals?
Seclusion From which sexes(s) are transsexuals restricted, for the sake 
of propriety, from sharing a secluded space?
Sexual behavior Will sexual relations by or with a transsexual violate rabbinic 
laws on homosexual conduct and non-vaginal ejaculation? 
Sex reversal 
treatment
With hormonal treatment underway, may a person proceed 
with sex change surgery? After surgery, must a person stop 
hormonal treatments—and even undergo reversal surgeries?
Touch and contact86 Which sex(es) are transsexuals restricted from touching? 
Witness Are FtM transsexuals considered fit witnesses for all pur-
poses, like observant males, or are they limited to witness 
roles for women?
Notes:
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the American Academy of Religion, Atlanta, 2010.
1. For the purposes of this paper, “transsexual/ity” refers to people who seek or have 
obtained sex change surgery. “Sex-change surgery” (SCS) refers to various surgeries and 
related medical treatments that Jewish legal discourse would regard as removing or alter-
ing sexual organs in order to change sex for a male-to-female (MtF) or female-to-male 
(FtM) transsexual. For better or worse, Jewish sources do not clarify precisely which 
surgeries are under discussion. This paper avoids the terms “gender” and “reassignment” 
Hillel Gray
100 • Nashim 29 (2015)
in discussing these surgeries, because they are often absent, ill-defined or contested in the 
rabbinic discourse under investigation. SCS herein does not include medical interventions 
for persons with intersex conditions (i.e., disorders of sexual development).
2. Suzanne J. Kessler, Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1985); Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of 
Identity (New York: Routledge, 1999).
3. For halakhic authorities who believe that surgery does not change one’s sex, staunch 
opposition to homosexuality can be taken for granted. In U.S. society, opposition to 
transsexuality is linked to homophobia; see: Aeyal M. Gross, “Gender Outlaws Before 
the Law: The Courts of the Borderlands,” Harvard Journal of Law & Gender, 32 (2009), 
pp. 165–231; Julie L. Nagoshi et al., “Gender Differences in Correlates of Homophobia 
and Transphobia,” Sex Roles, 59/7–8 (May 2008), pp. 521–531. But see Talia Mae Bett-
cher, “Evil Deceivers and Make-Believers: On Transphobic Violence and the Politics of 
Illusion,” Hypatia, 22/3 (2007), pp. 43–65.
4. There are gaps in my effort to gather a complete dataset. This paper focuses on statements 
of rabbinic law regarding SCS, not on actual practices within Orthodox communities.
5. Edan Ben-Ephraim, Dor tahepukhot (Hebrew; Jerusalem: [Ben-Ephraim Family], 2004; 
henceforth: Dor tahepukhot). The title, drawn from Deut. 32:20, could be rendered as 
the more neutral “Generation of reversals,” but “perversions” fits the Introduction’s tone, 
which refers to SCS as an abomination and a loathsome affair (to’evah, shikutz). As a 
caveat, it is difficult to place any given rabbinic text within the social, medical and legal 
context of SCS, because authors rarely cite non-Jewish sources or reveal their awareness 
of contemporaneous sources on transsexuality. Moreover, since many writings deal with 
SCS in the abstract, the published discourse may not reflect rabbinic deliberations on con-
crete cases. Nothing in this paper should be construed as providing Jewish law guidance 
for any personal decisions.
6. Ben-Ephraim has also written two monographs on family purity: Sefer ‘Edan hato-
horah (Hebrew; Jerusalem: self-published, 2002) and Kuntres ‘Et milḥamah (Hebrew; 
Jerusalem: self-published, 2003).
7. The approbations in the book are signed by Rabbis Shlomo Moshe Amar, formerly the 
Sefardi Chief Rabbi of Israel; Zalman Nehemiah Goldberg of the Rabbinical High Court, 
Jerusalem, and the Jerusalem College of Technology; Yosef Lieberman, who held leader-
ship positions in a yeshiva and a synagogue in Jerusalem; Asher Zelig Weiss, a yeshiva 
head, communal rabbi and senior judge of rabbinic civil law in Jerusalem; Yitzḥak Yosef 
and Ovadiah Yosef.
8. One exception is an unpublished paper by Hillel Lavery-Yisraeli, an Orthodox rabbi 
working for a non-Orthodox synagogue in Sweden; see below, notes 45 and 65. I first 
learned of Lavery-Yisraeli’s views from an article published in the YU Observer (October 
2008).
9. Sex-change surgery is described matter-of-factly by, among others, Avraham Sofer Abra-
ham, Nishmat Avraham: Hilkhot ḥolim rofʼim urefuʼah ʻal arbaʻat ḥelkei haShulḥan 
ʻarukh, I–IV (Jerusalem, 2007); J. David Bleich, “Transsexual Surgery and Ambigu-
ous Genitalia,” in Judaism and Healing: Halakhic Perspectives (Hoboken: Ktav, 1981), 
pp. 74–79; Aryeh Leib Grossnass, Lev Aryeh, Part II (London: Hamadpis, 1973), no. 
49, p. 166; Avraham Hirsch, “Artificial Transformation of Male to Female and Female 
to Male,” No‘am, 16 (n.d.), pp. 152–155; Avraham Steinberg, “Nituaḥ haḥlafat min,” 
Entziklopediya hilkhatit refu’it (Jerusalem: Schlesinger Institute, 1994), IV, pp. 609–612 
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(excerpted English translation in Mordechai Halperin, “Transexuality,” Jewish Medical 
Ethics, 3/2 [1998], pp. 74–75); and Eliezer Waldenberg, Tzitz Eli‘ezer, I–XXII, n.d. (see 
below, notes 35, 40 and 46).
10. Bleich, “Transsexual Surgery” (above, note 9), p. 98.
11. Shalom Krausz, “On the New Abomination of Changing from Men to Women,” Hama’or, 
25/2 (Kislev–Tevet 5733 [1972]), pp. 12–13 (Hebrew). Cf. Yitzḥak Liebes, Beit Avi, III, 
§158:5, as cited in Dor tahepukhot, p. 8.
12. Martha Nussbaum, From Disgust to Humanity: Sexual Orientation and Constitutional 
Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
13. Hananya Yom Tov Lipa Teitelbaum, “A Question Regarding the Present-Day Effrontery 
of Changing from Male to Female and Vice Versa,” Hama’or, 25/2 (above, note 11), pp. 
10–13 (Hebrew).
14. Citing Sefer Haḥinukh §244 on Lev. 19:19
15. Krausz, “New Abomination” (above, note 11), p. 13 (Hebrew), citing Sefer Haḥinukh §62. 
However, his formulation implies that cosmetic surgery, as a change in creation, might 
be forbidden as sorcery. Ben-Ephraim, in Dor Tahepukhot, pp. 61f, argues that the mixed 
seed and sorcery rules ought not to be stretched creatively to cover SCS.
16. Teitelbaum, “A Question” (above, note 13), p. 12. Although Teitelbaum opposes SCS for 
FtM transsexuals, it is noteworthy that much of his analysis focuses on MtF situations.
17. Meir Amsel, “A Male Transgressor Who Was Surgically Changed into a Female, or Vice 
Versa—If They Wished to Revert, What Would Be the Law Regarding Their Social and 
Sexual Relations, and All the Other Commandments,” Hama’or, 25/2 (above, note 11), 
pp. 14–15 (Hebrew). Amsel compares the issue of SCS to the future need for rulings on 
people with mamzer status, Siamese twins, faking death with a near-double and artificial 
insemination.
18. In this analogy, the androgynous being reflects transsexuality, and the divine separation 
presages surgery.
19. Amsel, “Male Transgressor” (above, note 17), p. 20, citing Rashi on Gen. 30:21, who 
refers to BT Berakhot 60a; Krausz, “New Abomination” (above, note 11), p. 13, citing the 
talmudic text directly. The Hama’or articles also shed light on the authors’ conceptions 
of sex, nature and gender.
20. Amsel, “Male Transgressor” (above, note 17), pp. 18 and 20, citing Sefer yetzirah as the 
means for creating a golem, as stated in BT Sanhedrin 65b.
21. Ibid., p. 21.
22. Hirsch, “Artificial Transformation” (above, note 9), p. 153.
23. Ḥayim Miranda, Yad ne’eman (Salonika, 5544 [1784]), p. 62a; Ḥayim Pelaggi, Yosef et 
’eḥav (Izmir, 5656 [1896]), 3:5. The latter addressed the status of a marriage involving a 
woman who apparently changed into a man.
24. Yigal Shafran, “Nituaḥ lehaḥlafat hamin (Sex-change surgery),” Teḥumin, 21 (5762 
[2002]), pp. 117–120.
25. E.g., the authorship of the mystical works Sefer Yetzirah and Besamim rosh.
26. Ben-Ephraim also says the patient would be liable for prior arrangements. He cites 
Teitelbaum, “A Question” (above, note 13), pp. 10–13.
27. Shulḥan ‘arukh, Even ha‘ezer 5:11. For diverse rabbinic views, see Shaul Weinreb, “Tubal 
Ligation and the Prohibition of Sirus,” Journal of Halacha & Contemporary Society, 40 
(Fall, 2000). As noted by Ben-Ephraim in Dor tahepukhot, pp. 261ff, authorities waive 
the castration prohibition for women on the basis of suffering, substantial need or family 
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harmony; e.g., Moshe Steinberg, “Sex Change for an Androginos [hermaphrodite],” Assia, 
1/1 (n.d.), pp. 144ff (Hebrew). Some rabbis hold that the prohibition of castration applies 
to women as a rabbinic edict only (and thus is less stringent than a prohibition ascribed 
directly to the Pentateuch) or even not at all. Ben-Ephraim (p. 44) points out that ster-
ilization of women by means of a potion was permitted (Shulḥan ‘arukh, Even ha‘ezer 
5:12), because it was not a tangible action. Weinreb also notes that here is no specific 
prohibition of passive sterilization. Accordingly, Ben-Ephraim may in effect be opening 
interpretive room for leniency with pre-operative hormonal treatments that aid an FtM 
transition. See also Dor tahepukhot, pp. 67f. Another question is whether the castration 
law depends on fertility. If so, hormonal treatments that cause infertility arguably may be 
prohibited only by rabbinic law.
28. Points made by Diane Klein, Walter Bockting, Autumn Benner and Eli Coleman, “Gay 
and Bisexual Identity Development among Female-to-Male Transsexuals in North Amer-
ica: Emergence of a Transgender Sexuality,” Archives of Sexual Behavior, 38/5 (March 
2009), pp. 688–701; G. Kockott and E.M. Fahrner, “Male-to-Female and Female-to-Male 
Transsexuals: A Comparison,” Archives of Sexual Behavior, 17/6 (1988), pp. 539–546; 
K. Rachlin, “Factors which Influence Individual’s Decisions when Considering Female-
to-Male Genital Reconstructive Surgery,” International Journal of Transgenderism, 
3/3 (1999), at http://www.iiav.nl/ezines/web/ijt/97-03/numbers/symposion/ijt990302.htm; 
A.M. Verschoor and J. Poortinga, “Psychosocial Differences between Dutch Male and 
Female Transsexuals,” Archives of Sexual Behavior, 17/2 (1988), pp. 173–178; Cordula 
Weitze and Susanne Osburg, “Transsexualism in Germany: Empirical Data on Epide-
miology and Application of the German Transsexuals’ Act during Its First Ten Years,” 
Archives of Sexual Behavior, 25/4 (August 1996), pp. 409–425.
29. Dor tahepukhot, pp. 52f and 128f.
30. The rule might, however, restrict the pre-operative transition known as the “real life 
experience.”
31. Ben-Ephraim notes that the prohibition is considered rabbinic, not biblical, by some 
authorities; p. 55.
32. Avraham Steinberg, for instance, refers to self-wounding, while mentioning as well 
that approval of SCS in Israel depends on a diagnosis of “appropriate psychological 
problems”; see idem, “Nituaḥ haḥlafat min” (above, note 9). Due to self-endangerment 
concerns, Ben-Ephraim states that both the patient and the Jewish doctor should refrain 
from surgery and anesthesia unless it is necessary or urgent. But this assumes that SCS 
does not qualify as needed treatment; see Dor tahepukhot, pp. 56–57. Ben-Ephraim 
later shows that the self-endangerment issue is more complex; see his footnote, ibid., 
p. 124.
33. On hysterectomies see the sources cited in Dor tahepukhot, pp. 261ff.
34. Ben-Ephraim cites Yekutiel Yehuda Teitelbaum, Avnei tzedek (reprinted Jerusalem, 1992), 
Yoreh de‘ah 149; Weiss, Minḥat Yitzḥak, I, §115; Feinstein, Igerot Moshe, Even ha‘ezer, 
III, §22 (on contraception), IV, §§36 (on sirus—castration or excision of the sexual organs) 
and 69 (on contraception) and Oraḥ ḥayim, II, §85 (on sirus for an institutionalized girl). 
He also cites, among others, Waldenberg, Tzitz Eli‘ezer, IV, §13, VIII, §15:12:1 (p.124); 
Yitzḥal Yosef, Yalkut Yosef, V, p. 98, note 19; Yitzḥak Tzioni, ‘Olat Yitzḥak, II, §235:3 
(p. 391); and Yisroel Dovid Harfenes, Nishmat shabat, §5:310 (p. 289). Medical protocols 
authorize SCS based on the patient’s mental health. See Heino F.L. Meyer-Bahlburg, 
“From Mental Disorder to Iatrogenic Hypogonadism: Dilemmas in Conceptualizing 
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Gender Identity Variants as Psychiatric Conditions,” Archives of Sexual Behavior, 39/2 
(October 2009), pp. 461–476.
35. Private conversation with “Michelle.” This possibility was also expressed by an Ortho-
dox rabbi at Merḥavim: Institute for the Advancement of Shared Citizenship in Israel; 
see Baruch Efrati, “Sex Change,” in “Ask the Rabbi,” www.kipa.co.il/ask/show/191457, 
September 3, 2009 (accessed July 9, 2015). For the lenient views of Hillel Lavery-Yisraeli 
and non-Orthodox rabbis, see note 65 below and the text there.
36. Biblical sexual prohibitions are not incontestably absolved if committed under duress 
(Michael Broyde, telephone conversation, 2010).
37. In this paper, phenotype refers to external appearances only, especially the primary sexual 
characteristics, and genotype to the genetic and chromosomal basis for sex identity.
38. For persons with male chromosomes whose phenotype changes during puberty, see, 
e.g., Peggy T. Cohen-Kettenis, “Gender Change in 46,XY Persons with 5α-Reductase-2 
Deficiency and 17β-Hydroxysteroid Dehydrogenase-3 Deficiency,” Archives of Sexual 
Behavior, 34/4 (August 2005), pp. 399–410. For a popular account, see Jeffrey Eugenides’ 
novel Middlesex (2002).
39. Tzitz Eli‘ezer, X, §25:26:6 (20 Shevat, 5727 [January 30, 1967]). But see below, at note 46, 
for a different view expressed by R. Waldenberg in 1997.
40. Tzitz Eli‘ezer, XI, §78 (11 Marcheshvan 5731 [November 10, 1970]). Translation by the 
author and Joshua Schreier. Cf. Mayer Rabinowitz, “Status of Transsexuals,” Committee 
on Jewish Law and Standards of the Rabbinical Assembly, December 3, 2003.
41. See Amsel, “Male Transgressor” (above, note 17); Menashe Klein, Mishneh halakhot 
(Brooklyn: Machon Mishne Halakhot Gedolot, 5763 [2003/4]), T VI, §47, undated letter; 
Dor tahepukhot, pp. 112ff. Ben-Ephraim appends a letter by Asher Weiss and also cites 
Ḥayim Greiniman, Sefer ḥidushim ube’urim, Kidushin, Even ha‘ezer, §44:3, p. 104, s.v. 
vehineh; Shaul Breisch, She’ilat Sha’ul, Even ha‘ezer, §9:1–2; and Yehoshua Neuwirth, 
oral communication cited in Sofer Abraham, Nishmat Avraham (above, note 9), Yoreh 
de‘ah, §262:11, p. 326, though Neuwirth objects to Waldenberg’s reasoning (Nishmat 
Avraham, Even ha‘ezer, §44:2, p. 268).
42. Hillel Gray, “Not Judging by Appearances: The Role of Genotype in Jewish Law on Inter-
sex Conditions,” Shofar, 30/4 (Summer 2012), pp. 126–148, notes 13–16; Sofer Abraham, 
Nishmat Avraham (above, note 9), Even ha’ezer §44:4.3.1; J. David Bleich, “Survey of 
Recent Halakhic Periodical Literature: Transsexual Surgery,” Tradition, 14/3 (1974), p. 96.
43. R.P. Fitzgibbons, P.M. Sutton and D. O’Leary, “The Psychopathology of ‘Sex Reassign-
ment’ Surgery: Assessing Its Medical, Psychological, and Ethical Appropriateness,” 
National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, 9/1 (2009), pp. 97–125; Benedict Guevin, “Sex 
Reassignment Surgery for Transsexuals: An Ethical Conundrum?,” National Catholic 
Bioethics Quarterly, 5/4 (2005), pp. 719–734; John Norton, “Vatican Says ‘Sex–Change’ 
Operation Does Not Change Person’s Gender,” Catholic News Service, January 2003, 
http://ai.eecs.umich.edu/people/conway/TS/CatholicTSDecision.html (accessed July 9, 
2015).
44. Based on communications with Orthodox Jewish transsexuals, including Beth Orens. For 
non-Orthodox transsexuals, see Noach Dzmura, Balancing on the Mechitza: Transgender 
in Jewish Community (Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books, 2010). However, as Diane 
Klein pointed out, an FtM transsexual who does not have reconstructive surgery (phallo-
plasty or metoidioplasty) would not appear to have male genitalia and, presumably, would 
reject halakhic sex assignment by either phenotype or genotype.
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45. Tzitz Eli‘ezer, XXII, §2 (22 Shevat 5757 [January 29, 1997]). Waldenberg’s first opinion can 
be read as a conjecture, not a ruling on an actual case, as noted by Hillel Ḥayim Lavery-
Yisraeli, “The Transsexual and Transgender in Halakhah” (unpublished manuscript, n.d.). 
In the 1997 ruling, Waldenberg reconsiders MtF transsexuality and invokes the laws of 
androginos and tumtum, which involve dubious halakhic gender. He thus seems to have 
shifted away from his earlier stance based on phenotype alone. Cf. the stance published 
by the American Reform movement’s rabbinic organization: CCAR Responsa, 5750, 
§8: “Conversion and Marriage after Transsexual Surgery” [1990], at: www.ccarnet.org/
responsa/tfn-no-5750-8-191-196/ (accessed June 18, 2015).
46. Bleich, “Survey: Transsexual Surgery” (above, note 42), p. 96; Shafran, “Nituaḥ lehaḥlafat 
hamin” (above, note 24); Dor Tahepukhot, p. 113. They suggest that Waldenberg rested 
on a valid legal principle in assigning sex by external appearance, but that he applied it 
incorrectly to the reconstructed genitalia of postoperative transsexuals. Alternatively, as 
suggested by Lavery-Yisraeli (“Transsexual,” above, note 45), Waldenberg doubted that 
phenotype could serve as a reliable criterion for transsexuals. Still, Lavery-Yisraeli attri-
butes a comparable, phenotypic position to R. Ovadiah Hedaya (Yaskil ‘avdi, §7:4), who 
was a leading Sephardi kabbalist and rabbinic judge in Israel (d. 1969).
47. Rabinowitz, “Status of Transsexuals” (above, note 40).
48. A genotypic assignment would be wrong for XY persons who develop primarily female 
bodies due to conditions such as complete androgen insensitivity syndrome (CAIS). See 
Ben-Ephraim’s analysis in Dor tahepukhot, pp. 112–115, and Gray, “Not Judging by 
Appearances” (above, note 42).
49. Asher Weiss, letter appended in Dor tahepukhot, pp. 280–282.
50. For CAIS and other sex-reversal intersex conditions, the natal-phenotype approach enables 
Jewish law to proceed with sex assignment against genotype, while reinforcing genotypic 
assignment for transsexuals. Dor Tahepukhot, pp. 113–115.
51. In this it resembles the. legal status of converts to Judaism.
52. Michael J. Broyde, “The Establishment of Maternity & Paternity in Jewish and American 
Law, Appendix: Sex Change Operations and Their Effect on Marital Status—A Brief 
Comparison,” National Jewish Law Review, 3 (1988), pp. 117–158 (available at www.jlaw.
com/Articles/maternity_appendix.html, accessed July 8, 2015).
53. Private communications, October 2010. Michelle and Naomi are pseudonyms.
54. Naomi was given the latter suggestion explicitly. The suggestion to pass as heteronorma-
tive may conform with Jewish law and the lived practice of many transsexuals.
55. Ben-Ephraim does not define his approach as a social relations principle per se, except to 
explain it as designed to prevent transgressions by either the transsexual or others around 
them; Dor tahepukhot, p. 34–36. He cites two opposing views, those of Raphael Evers 
(Shut Ṿeshav ṿerafa [Jerusalem: Eliezer Fisher, 1994], §79), and Shafran (above, note 24); 
and justifies his view at length (e.g., pp. 136, 140–148), though with limited support (e.g., 
Amsel, “Male Transgressor” [above, note 17], p. 163, note 30). I do not claim that Ben-
Ephraim originated this principle.
56. The principle is generally grounded on concerns for sexual and interpersonal impropriety 
as well as recognition of the social ramifications of “passing” as another gender.
57. One future avenue may be marriage: Michelle reported that an Orthodox rabbi had pri-
vately offered to officiate were she to get married. This offer has not been confirmed and 
otherwise would seem to be prohibited.
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58. Compare Dor tahepukhot, p. 163, to Amsel, “Male Transgressor” (above, note 17), p. 19.
59. Kabbalah is a non-legal discourse with mystical elements. Leaving no stone unturned 
in seeking analogies to SCS, Ben-Ephraim deploys kabbalah and other rabbinic lore 
(agadah), a genre that tends to be downplayed in halakhic writings. See Shafran, “Nituaḥ 
lehaḥlafat hamin” (above, note 24).
60. Against a view of the soul as form and the body as matter, Guevin argues that the soul 
is “a spiritual nature that informs the [gendered] body.” Guevin, “Sex Reassignment 
Surgery” (above, note 43).
61. As a result, Ben-Ephraim refers not to “natal sex” but rather to “original sex.”
62. His examples of such reversals include: anal intercourse by a married couple (BT Nedarim 
20a); homosexual or other sins (per Ḥayim Vital’s Gate of Reincarnations); the measure 
for measure principle (per Natan Shapira’s Matzat shimurim); Yael, the biblical slayer 
of Sisera (Judges 4–5); Isaac at the time of his sacrificial binding; the wife of Ḥayim 
Vital, who had a male soul and gave birth only to daughters; and Saul’s daughter Michal, 
who was said to have donned phylacteries (BT Eruvin 96a). He also mentions souls that 
changed their status as priests or as Hebrew slaves. Dor Tahepukhot, p. 78.
63. See p. 81, where he is not citing any rabbinic sources.
64. It is not clear why Ben-Ephraim wrote in this way. Perhaps the book served as a way 
for him to work out his own ruminations about SCS; or, as he indicated in a private 
communication, perhaps he was merely pursuing a rhetorical argument.
65. Dror Brama, “Analysis of the Definition of ‘Incompetent for One Matter’ in the Case of 
Transsexuality” (Hebrew; unpublished manuscript, n.d.). He views his analysis as purely 
legal, not sympathetic per se (private communication, October 2010).
 The more ambitious claim advanced by Lavery-Yisraeli (“Transsexual,” above, note 45) 
is that, on the basis of kabbalistic thought, halakhah could assign gender identity based on 
psychological examination and personal self-reflection. His view posits halakhic approval 
for the surgery itself. See also YU Observer (above, note 8).
66. On the “wrong body” narrative, see: Darryl Hill, “Dear Doctor Benjamin: Letters from 
Transsexual Youth (1963–1976),” International Journal of Transgenderism, 10/3 (Decem-
ber 2008), pp. 149–170; Douglas Mason-Schrock, “Transsexuals’ Narrative Construc-
tion of the ‘True Self,’ ” Social Psychology Quarterly, 59/3 (1996), pp. 176–192; and 
Sandy Stone, “The ‘Empire’ Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto” (1993), http:// 
pendientedemigracion.ucm.es/info/rqtr/biblioteca/Transexualidad/trans%20manifesto.
pdf (accessed July 8, 2015). See also Dave King, “Condition, Orientation, Role or False 
Consciousness? Models of Homosexuality and Transsexualism,” Sociological Review, 
32/1 (February 1984), pp. 38–56.
67. Harry Benjamin, The Transsexual Phenomenon (New York: Julian Press, 1966; electronic 
edition: Düsseldorf: Symposium, 1999), p. 9. Cf. idem, “Transvestism and Transsexual-
ism in the Male and Female,” Journal of Sex Research, 3/2 (May 1, 1967), pp. 107–127.
68. The trapped body concept is also mentioned by Dror Brama, “What Is the Relation of 
Jewish Law to Transgender Persons?” Ynet, July 8, 2008, www.ynet.co.il/Ext/Comp/
ArticleLayout/CdaArticlePrintPreview/1,2506,L-3564862,00.html (Hebrew; accessed 
June 25, 2015).
69. In order to participate in Orthodox Jewish life, some transsexuals have received oral 
or written guidance in private. As far as I know, all transsexuals discussed in public 
statements have remained anonymous.
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70. To be sure, some rabbis have long held a medical view of transsexuality. Bleich, “Survey: 
Transsexual Surgery” (above, note 42), p. 97; Steinberg “Nituaḥ haḥlafat min” (above, 
note 9), p. 609. Shafran treats an FtM transsexual as having a psychological illness, as 
against the natural, innate desire of women to be mothers and wives. But he also treats it 
as a decision from within a corrupt, modern society.
71. E.g., King, “Condition, Orientation” (above, note 66); Fitzgibbons et al., “Psychopathology” 
(above, note 43).
72. Brama, “Analysis” (above, note 65). On the history of the DSM diagnosis, see Meyer-
Bahlburg, “From Mental Disorder” (above, note 34). Though Brama uses the modern 
Hebrew term for gender (migdar), he refers to sex (min) when discussing personal status 
in Jewish law.
73. Brama associates this possible exemption with Ezekiel Landau, Or hayashar §30.
74. On the other hand, Brama believes that an obsessive disorder could disqualify a postop-
erative transsexual from conversion to Judaism.
75. Cf. the concern for “compassion, mercy and connection” mentioned in a response by 
R. Yuval Cherlow, “Transsexual,” 29 Nisan 5767 (April 17, 2007), www.kipa.co.il/ask/
show/115532 (Hebrew; accessed July 9, 2015).
76. Rabinowitz, “Status of Transsexuals” (above, note 40).
77. Sharzer argues in an unpublished responsum that transsexuality is similar to a rare inter-
sex condition, because the transsexual is a hybrid with a male body and a female psyche, 
or vice versa.
78. Arguably, SCS might be excused when done not as a willful sin but under the duress 
(’ones) of a psychological compulsion. Orthodox transsexuals told me that such accep-
tance has been expressed privately by an influential rabbi, and it is conjectured of Cherlow, 
“Transsexual” (above, note 75). From a technical standpoint, an excuse of duress (were it 
justified) need not be confirmed by a rabbinic opinion, though it may have pastoral value 
(Broyde, telephone conversation, 2010).
79. Based largely on Dor tahepukhot.
80. Since women are not permitted to receive such an honor in Orthodox synagogues, it is 
noteworthy that SCS might make it possible for them to do so. See Amsel, “Male Trans-
gressor” (above, note 17), p. 19; Dor tahepukhot, p. 163.
81. Bleich, “Survey: Transsexual Surgery” (above, note 42), p. 97. In addition, the question 
is raised Dor tahepukhot (p. 161) as to whether the blessing recited upon seeing unusual 
creatures (e.g., giants) should be said about a transsexual.
82. According to a responsum published in the name of the Itim Institute, burial would be 
determined by the debated assignment of halakhic sex; see “Burial for Jewish Trans-
sexuals,” August 8, 2007, http://moreshet.co.il/web/shut/shut2.asp?id=92326 (Hebrew; 
accessed December 10, 2015). A more severe view is that no ritual purification is needed 
for transsexuals. See Ya‘akov Ariel, “Burial Purification for a Person Who Underwent 
a Sex Change Operation,” May 21, 2006, www.yeshiva.org.il/ask/?id=19444 (Hebrew; 
accessed December 10, 2015).
83. Chaim Rapoport, “Conversion of an Uncircumcised Male Who Underwent Treatments 
to Change His Bodily Form and His Sex,” Kesher: Platform for European Rabbis to 
Research Jewish Law (February 2004).
84. In rabbinic law, only men can perform certain rituals on behalf of other men, including 
the fulfillment of certain commandments and leading prayer services.
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85. While rabbinic opinions generally forbid marriage with an MtF transsexual, marriage 
does seem to be encouraged, at least prior to surgery, by Efrati, “Sex Change” (above, note 
35). According to Rabbi Eitan Zan-Bar, people who were originally women are permitted 
to marry, but not MtF persons who have transgressed the castration prohibition. See idem, 
“Sex Change,” Ask the Rabbi, May 14, 2009, www.kipa.co.il/ask/print.asp?id=180822 
(Hebrew; accessed December 10, 2015).
86. Touching between the sexes is restricted for the sake of modesty and avoiding male con-
tact with women who are considered menstruants. Rabbinic opinions vary. For instance, 
Zan-Bar, in “Sex Change” (above, note 85), says that it is permitted for men to touch a still 
male MtF transsexual. Ben-Ephraim, with his hybrid approach to assignment, differs on 
matters of physical contact and social interactions of men and women, holding that men 
are not permitted purposefully to touch an MtF transwoman, and women may touch her.
